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NOTES
mitted itself greater latitude in reviewing the justification for specific
action of the military at the scene of civil crisis. The attention of the
court is thus directed not only to the exigencies of the general situation,
but also to the reasonableness of the particular means taken to handle it.
To the federal courts, therefore, rule by martial law should present a
problem no different than that of any other state action subversive of
individual rights. The nature of permissible action by the National Guard
in dealing with civil disorder should be defined by its position as an arm
of state power and not by the status of the troops as a military force.
When the military contemplates overriding individual rights it must,
therefore, be guided by those judicial decisions outlining the permissible
scope of their invasion, and must be prepared to justify its action in
court. Unreasonable use of state power cannot be conjured into le-
gality simply by invoking the talisman of martial law.
Conclusion: The governor of a state has no power to rule by mar-
tial law. The governor's power to use the troops in civil disturbances
arises from his duty to see that the laws are executed. This duty does not
encompass the power to suspend civil government, but requires only the
use of that force necessary to quell lawlessness. In carrying out their mis-
sion the troops are bound to follow legal procedures. The extent of their
power is that of any peace officer acting under similar circumstances.
ARBITRATION OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE BREACHES: AN
ANSWER TO SECTION 301 OF THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
Under Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act labor unions are subject
to suit in federal courts for non-compliance with no-strike provisions in
collective bargaining agreements.1 Litigation of union liability is main-
tained despite provisions in the agreements for grievance and arbitration
procedures designed for the settlement of disputes arising between the
parties. The result may well mean invasion and frustration of the volun-
tarily established processes by which the parties have agreed to govern
their relations.
Some form of no-strike provision is included in more than 89 per
argues that martial law in a theater of war could be proclaimed at the discretion of the
President, and therefore is not subject to judicial review.
1. 61 STAT. 157 (1947); 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1952).
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cent of modern day collective bargaining agreements.2 The union usually
pledges not to engage in any "strike, stoppage, or other interruption of
work" during the life of the agreement.3 The pledge is either uncondi-
tional or conditioned on the company's adherence to the terms and con-
ditions of the agreement.' It may also except union-authorized strikes
in the event of exhaustion of the grievance procedure or a deadlock dur-
ing collective bargaining.' The use of grievance and arbitration pro-
cedures is the parties' alternative to strikes and lockouts to enforce their
demands. The arbitration provision usually covers "all disputes, dif-
ferences, and grievances concerning matters in this contract."'
Whatever the form of the provisions, they reflect increasing re-
sponsibility and insight on the part of both labor and management which
has led to reliance upon amicable settlement of disputes. Unions are now
content to restrict their right to economic action. This bilateral ap-
2. This figure is even higher in plant union agreements. BNA, COLLECTIVE BAR-
GAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS 15:325 (1954). Of the 11% of collective bargain-
ing agreements which do not contain a no-strike clause, 9 to 10% contain some form of
arbitration procedure. The future of no-strike clauses was placed in doubt by a recent
'decision of the First Circuit in International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL v. W. L.
Mead, Inc., 37 L.R.R.M. 2679 (1956), which held that an arbitration procedure which is
the "exclusive" means of settling disputes is the equivalent of a no-strike clause. The
decision affirmed an award of damages totaling $359,000 against a local union which
struck over a dispute rather than taking it to arbitration. For the district court back-
ground of the case, the facts of which are illustrative of the type of situations which
may arise in the area, see 129 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1955) ; 126 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass.
1954). See also BNA, LABOR RELATIONS REPORTER, 37 ANALYSIS 81 (1956). If the
Mead case is followed, under 98 to 99% of the nearly 100,000 collective bargaining
agreements presently in force, a striking union may be faced with substantial liability
regardless of whether the contract contains no-strike provisions. The leading study of
no-strike clauses prior to 1947 is Daykin, The No-Strike Clause, 11 U. PITT. L. REv. 13
(1949). For the effect of Taft Hartley, see Fulda, The No-Strike Clause, 21 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 127 (1952) (1952 Report of the Committee on Improvement of Administration
of Union-Employer Contracts of the American Bar Association), reprinted in MArtHEWs,
READINGS ON LABOR LAW 121 (1953).
3. See, e.g., contract quoted in Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. Int'l Union,
United Furniture Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493, 494 (D. Md. 1948) ; CCH UNION CONTRACT
CLAUSES 701.021 (1954).
4. With the advent of long-term contracts, unconditional no-strike clauses are pass-
ing from vogue. The Bureau of National Affairs estimates that less than 40% of col-
lective bargaining agreements contain unconditional strike bans. See note 2 supra.
Conditional no-strike pledges lift bans if one or more of the following conditions occur
(percentages based upon the BNA estimate of prevalency) : (1) the grievance ma-
chinery is followed to its final step without resolution of a dispute, 15%5; (2) an arbi-
tration award is violated, 7%; (3) the agreement itself is violated, 5%lo; (4) a deadlock
is reached in reopening negotiations, 22%5; (5) an issue is not considered a proper
subject for the grievance procedure or arbitration, 5%; (6) the strike is called in ac-
cordance with the union's constitution and by-laws, 25; (7) a vote of the employees
is taken, 3%.
5. See note 4 supra.
6. See, e.g., contract quoted in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalga-
mated Association of Street Employees, 98 F. Supp. 789, 790 (W.D. Pa. 1951); CCH
UNION CONTRACT CLAUSES 51,552 (1954).
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proach to labor relations points the way to continuity of production,
which must be the goal of both parties. The creation of a competing
forum in the federal courts under section 301 has threatened to break
down this voluntary system.
Prior to 1947, management, hindered by low or nonexistent union
funds, difficulty in proof of damages, and in a few cases, procedural
inability to sue an unincorporated body, normally did not litigate or
arbitrate a union's financial responsibility for a strike.' Then, Congress
responded to what it believed was a desperate need for legislation by
enacting section 301.8 The section provides for suits in federal courts
for violations of collective bargaining agreements, and abolishes for this
purpose the customary requirements of diversity of citizenship and juris-
dictional amount.9 The net effect of the section has been that manage-
7. No instances of litigation, which occurred prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, are
reported, and only two arbitrations of union financial liability for strikes could be found.
See Motor Haulage Co., Inc., 6 Lab. Arb. 721 (1947) ; Brynmore Press, Inc., 7 Lab.
Arb. 649 (1947). Both awarded damages for breach of a no-strike clause. The former,
however, was reversed, Motor Haulage Co. v. Teamsters, 69 N.Y.S.2d 656 (Sup. Ct.
1947), on the ground that the strike was unauthorized and beyond the power of the
union to prevent
8. According to Senator Taft, the need for section 301 did not arise from the
problem of substantive enforceability but from that of procedural difficulty in obtaining
jurisdiction over labor unions. "All we provide in this amendment," he said, "is that
voluntary associations shall in effect be suable as if they were corporations. . . ." 93
CONG. REc. 4265 (1947). Opponents of the measure point to the fact that, in 1947,
union funds could not be reached in only 13 states. See Kaye and Allen, Union Respon-
sibility and the Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 30 B.U.L. REv. 1,
7-15 (1950) ; Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 902 (1955).
9. Grave constitutional issues were raised against the section in Association
of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437
(1955). Although the net result of the decision was merely to limit the coverage of the
section by disallowing a suit by a union seeking unpaid wages for its members, the
opinion leaves the section's future in doubt. The possibility of unconstitutionality, as
raised by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, id. at 439, stems from the fact that Con-
gressional history shows Congress intended only a procedural grant See note 8 supra.
See also 93 CONG. RFc. 4153, 5118 (1947) ; 92 CONG. REc. 5705 (1947). Since diversity
and jurisdictional amount were waived, federal jurisdiction must be based on the "arising
under" language of Article III, Section 2 of the Federal Constitution. Thus, the right
which a party seeks to vindicate in a 301 suit must be one "arising under" the laws or
Constitution of the United States, and if the section failed to create substantive rights,
it may well be unconstitutional. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936);
Osburn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). But see Bell v. Hood,
327 U.S. 678 (1946). Although there is no doubt as to the power of Congress to legis-
late in the area, NLRB v. Jones Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1947), the only
justification for the constitutionality of section 301 would be an unspoken mandate on
the part of Congress to the federal judiciary, ordering the development of a federal labor
law. The lower federal courts have held the section constitutional by finding "implied"
substantive rights. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. International Union, United
Furniture Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), affd, 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) ;
Textile Workers, CIO v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951) ; Shirley-Herman
Co. v. International Hod Carriers, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Waialua Agricultural
Co. v1 United Sugar Workers, 114 F. Supp. 243 (D. Hawaii 1953) ; Pepper and Potter,
Inc, v. Local 977, United Automobile Workers, CIO, 103 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ;
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ment, in the event of a union-sponsored walkout, is not as intent on dis-
ciplining the employees guilty of the breach"0 but, instead, institutes an
action against the union for damages." The propriety of resort to a
lawsuit rather than to arbitration is questionable.
The fact situation which gives rise to the problem follows a general
pattern. In their collective bargaining agreement the union and manage-
ment provide a no-strike clause, a grievance procedure, and an arbitra-
tion procedure. The union, in disregard of an unconditional pledge, or,
if the pledge is conditioned on management's adherence to the terms of
the agreement, thinking there has been a breach, calls a strike. Manage-
ment institutes a suit for damages under 301. The union enters and
Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, CIO, 83 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
It is probable that Mr. Justice Frankfurter believes the section unconstitutional but could
not gain the agreement of a majority in the Westinghouse case, the facts of which could
be solved by limitation rather than invalidation. He was joined in his opinion by Mr.
Justice Burton and Mr. Justice Minton. Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Clark
concurred in the result but expressly refused to consider the issue of constitutionality.
Mr. Justice Harlan did not participate. A subsequent case, squarely in point, could effect
the demise of the section. See Wallace, The Contract Cause of Action Under the Taft-
Hartley Act, 16 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (1950) ; Miller and Ryza, Suits By and Against
Labor Organizations Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1955 U. ILL. L. FORUm;
Mishkin, The "Federal Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 157, 185-94
(1953) ; Note, 57 YALE L. J. 630 (1948).
10. Prior to the advent of the Taft-Hartley Act, the issues which arose over no-
strike bans usually covered penalties assessed against individual workers guilty of wildcat
or union-sponsored walkouts. The doctrine of individual liability for contract violations
is based on NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939), where the Supreme Court
held that employees striking in breach of a contract provision were outside the protection
of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board applied the Sands doctrine in uphold-
ing penalties which included discharge in Kittinger Co., Inc., 65 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1948) ;
Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 445 (1947); The Fanfair Bearing Co., 73
N.L.R.B. 1008 (1947). For judicial reiteration of the Sands doctrine, see NLRB v.
Reynolds Int'l Pen Co., 162 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1947) (striking employees not protected
by NLRA).
The allowable penalties included discharge or suspension, loss of specified contractual
benefits, loss of strike time, or fines. For representative arbitrations concerning penalties,
see Lancaster Iron Works, 4 Lab. Arb. 759 (1946) (rehiring); Par-Metal Products
Corp., 4 Lab. Arb. 794 (1946) (damages) ; Pittsburgh Tube Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 285 (1946)
(discharge) ; Bethlehem Steel Corp., 2 Lab. Arb. 207 (1945) (loss of pay) ; Fruehauf
Trailer Co., 1 Lab. Arb. 155 (1944) (discharge) ; January and Wood Co., 1 Lab. Arb
577 (1942) (discharge).
11. The only significant change in the wording of no-strike clauses caused by
section 301 resulted from subsection (e), which provides that employers and labor or-
ganizations will be liable for the acts of their agents. Whether the specific acts
performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified will not be controlling.
This was an obvious attempt to circumvent section 6 of the Norris LaGuardia
Act, 47 STAT. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. 106 (1952), which disclaimed liability of unions or
their officers and members for unlawful acts of others "except upon clear proof of actual
participation in, or actual authorization of, such acts. . . ." See United Brotherhood
of Carpenters v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1946). Unions, foreseeing unlimited
liability for wildcat strikes over which they had no control, immediately began includ-
ing disclaimers of liability for unauthorized or forbidden walkouts. See CCH UNioN
CONTRACT CLAUSES 51,701.06 (1954) ; Note, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 384 (1949).
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moves for a stay in the proceedings pending arbitration of its liability
which it contends was provided in the agreement. In the past, the fate
of these mbtions has depended on two issues: the scope of the arbitra-
tion clause in the individual agreements and the applicability of the
United States Arbitration Act,'" upon which the unions base their mo-
tions for stay. 3
The issue over the scope of the arbitration clause frequently arises
from ambiguous provisions and lack of foresight on the part of union
and management in drafting their agreements. 4 These faults have been
aggravated, however, by the federal judiciary's insistence on strict con-
struction and a lack of sympathy for policies favoring arbitration over
litigation. 5
The problem stems originally from the inclusion of the provision
for arbitration as a final step in the grievance procedure or its placement
immediately thereafter, which implies dependence on the grievance pro-
cedure.' Thus, an agreement may include in its grievance procedure a
series of three to five steps, the first of which calls for the aggrieved
employee to take his complaint to his department foreman. The final
12. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-9 (1952).
13. See p. 480 infra. See Sturges and Murphy, Same Confusing Matters Re-
lating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoB. 580, 605 (1952) ; Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 902, 912 (1955).
14. At least two courts have pointed out the mistakes made by the parties and
impliedly urged their correction. See International Union, United Furniture Workers v.
Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Bassick Co. v. Bas-
sick Local 229, affiliated with International Union of Elec. Workers, CIO, 126 F. Supp.
777, 779 (1954).
15. In dissenting in Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d
435, 438 (2d Cir. 1953), where the court denied a motion to stay, Judge Clark said,
"Even had it seemed to me less clear I should have thought such a broad and enlightened
interpretation desirable in the context of modern labor practice; if arbitration is to be
fostered against conflicting statutory provisions . . . surely it should be upheld where
agreement points and law does not forbid. If there be a binding agreement to arbitrate
the resort to a strike here, the existence of the very cause for arbitration cannot con-
stitute a breach ending the defendant's right to arbitrate as the district court held."
Courts have also applied strict contract principles in denying stays. The district
court in the Markel case, U. S. DIST. CT. (W.D.N.Y. 1952), held that the calling of a
strike was a material breach of the contract which terminated it, thereby relieving the
company of any duty it might otherwise have had under the contract to submit to arbi-
tration. In the Colonial Hardwood case, 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948), the court appears
to have used a "clean hands" theory in denying a stay. "Damages resulting from strikes
and lockouts could not reasonably be held subject to arbitration under a procedure which
expressly forbids strikes and lockouts and provides for the settlement of grievances in
order that they may be avoided." Id. at 35. See also Metal Polishers Union, AFL v.
Rubin, 85 F. Supp. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1949). This same court, in Philadelphia Dress Joint
Board v. Rosinsky, 134 F. Supp. 607 (1955), implied it would enforce arbitration either
by granting a motion to stay or a claim for specific performance only where the moving
party had not first broken terms of the contract. Id. at 609.
16. See, e.g., contract quoted in United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products,
Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 223 (4th Cir. 1954).
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step may call for a meeting of the union committee and the plant manage-
ment. If no settlement is reached, either party may invoke the arbitra-
tion procedure." Yet, most arbitration clauses, regardless of their posi-
tion in relation to the grievance procedure, call for settlement of prob-
lems other than employee grievances by words such as "all disputes,
differences, and grievances that may arise between the parties to this
contract. . . ." The breadth of this language and the complexity of
plant relationships indicate the parties' intention to provide arbitration
of problems independent of employee grievances. Most contracts, how-
ever, are silent as to what additional scope is intended.
Other contracts fail even to hint that the employer might have a
need for resort to arbitration. They contain a step-by-step procedure for
employee grievances, the last step of which provides that if no settlement
is reached, the dispute may be referred to arbitration."8 It is possible to
argue that since the employer is not an employee, it cannot initiate a
grievance and, consequently, could never take its claims to arbitration. 9
The better drafted agreements, however, include breaches of the agree-
ment within the scope of arbitration," define a grievance to include
17. Courts have generally denied motions to stay in cases arising under contracts
such as this on the ground that the disputes which may be taken to arbitration are
limited to those which could have been the subject of a grievance. United Elec. Workers
v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., supra note 16; Harris Hub and Spring Co. v. United
Elec. Workers, 121 F. Supp. 40 (D. Pa. 1954).
18. See, e.g., contract quoted in Borg-Warner v. Farm Equipment Workers, 22
Lab. Arb. 443 (N.D. II1. 1954).
19. "It is to be noted that the entire procedure is geared to adjust grievances of
employees and that it is completely silent as to any possible grievances by the em-
ployer. . . . [I]t is not an employee and it would be absurd to suggest that it should
initiate a grievance or complaint with the shop foreman, yet . . . it can proceed to
arbitration only after the 'above procedure has been complied with'." Square D Co. v.
United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776, 783 (E.D. Mich. 1954). See also Borg-Warner
v. Farm Equipment Workers, 22 Lab. Arb. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1954), in which the court
said "but even if a plausible explanation could not be found, the condition upon which
arbitration can be invoked, namely, the unsatisfactory answer by the Works Manager,
is so definite and inflexible that it cannot be made to yield to an ambiguous over-state-
ment in the definition of a grievance." This was despite a definition which read: "A
grievance is a difference of opinion as to the meaning and application of the provisions
of the Agreement or as to the compliance of either party hereto with any of its obliga-
tions under this agreement." Id. at 445. (Emphasis added.)
In Bassick Co. v. Bassick Local 229, affiliated with International Union of Elec.
Workers, CIO, 126 F. Supp. 777 (D. Conn. 1954), the court obviously felt arbitration
was to be desired over litigation but that its hands were tied by the poor draftsmanship
which resulted in making the arbitration merely a final step in the grievance procedure.
"[T]he company might well feel that labor management relations would be improved
by submission of a dispute to arbitration. There is here, however, no separate article,
general in nature, providing for arbitration outside the grievance procedure." Id. at 779.
20. The arbitration clause cited in Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers,
CIO, 95 F. Supp. 851 (1951) provided, "All grievances, complaints, differences or dis-
putes arising out of or relating to this agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be settled
in the following manner: . . ." Id. at 853. A motion for a stay pending arbitration of
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managerial claims2 and provide a point at which the employer may enter
the grievance procedure and, if no satisfactory settlement is achieved,
refer his claim to arbitration.2
Differences in the scope of arbitration clauses could be explained by
the language the parties employed if it were not for the fact that courts
have interpreted nearly identical clauses to opposite ends. In UE
Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc.," the arbitration clause extended
to "all differences, disputes, and grievances.""4 The court indicated that
arbitration of an alleged breach of the agreement's no-strike clause was
without the scope of arbitration. In Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v.
Amalgamated Ass'n 5 the court interpreted an agreement calling for arbi-
tration of "all differences, disputes and grievances, other than discipline
and discharge cases . . .between the parties arising out of or by virtue
of the within collective bargaining agreement" as covering an alleged
liability for a strike was granted. For an opposite result, however, see the Borg-Warner
case, supra note 19.
21. "Grievances within the meaning of the grievance procedure and of this arbi-
tration clause shall consist only of disputes about the interpretation or application of
particular clauses of the Agreement and about alleged violations of the Agreement ...
[I]n the event of a desire by either party to arbitrate the grievance, it shall be referred
to an arbitrator. . . ." Contract between Lever Brothers Co. and Local 336, United
Gas Workers, March 4, 1952. Cited in CCH LAB. L. REP. 51,933 (1954). (Emphasis
added.)
22. "(54) Any grievances which the Corporation may have against the Union . . .
shall be presented by the Plant Manager involved to the Shop Committee of that plant.
In the event that the matter is not settled within two weeks . . . it may be appealed
to the third step of the Grievance Procedure . .. [T]hereafter the matter will be
considered at the third step of the Procedure. .... [I]f the matter is not satisfactorily
settled at this meeting or within five days thereafter by agreement, the case may be
appealed to the Umpire by the Corporation." Contract between General Motors Corp.
and United Automobile Workers, CIO, May 29, 1950. Cited in CCH LAB. L. REP.
51,933 (1954).
23. 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954), affirming 121 F. Supp. 731 (D. Md. 1954). The
district court denied the motion to stay on the inapplicability of section 3 of the Arbi-
tration Act but implied that were it not for the act, it would hold the scope of such an
all-inclusive arbitrtation clause as covering union liability for breach of a no-strike clause.
24. Id. at 223.
25. 98 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Pa. 1951), rev'd o other grounds. 192 F.2d 310 (3rd
Cir. 1951) (Arbitration Act held inapplicable). The District Court, in granting a stay,
said, "We believe this language [arbitration clause] is clear and unambiguous and does
not admit of any explanation or limitation by parol evidence or otherwise. On the con-
trary, it seems clear to us that if the employer had occasion to resort to the grievance
and arbitration machinery of the contract, it would very likely be in connection with a
strike." Id. at 791. In Wilson Brothers v. Textile Workers, CIO, 132 F. Supp. 163
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), the court granted a stay pending arbitration under a clause similar to
the one in United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 227, 223 (4th
Cir. 1954), and those cited in the text above, and said, "A broader grant of arbitration
jurisdiction is difficult to envisage." Id. at 164.
State courts faced with the issue have granted stays pending arbitration on the
strength of all-inclusive clauses. Hudson Co. v. Allied Trades Council, AFL, 3 N.J.
Super. 327, 65 A.2d 557 (1949) ; Application of Stewart Stamping Corp., 285 App. Div.
953, 138 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
breach of a no-strike clause and granted a stay pending arbitration."
The courts have consistently refused to recognize the intent of the
parties, as evidenced by the terms of the agreement, to rely on the arbi-
trator to settle problems arising between them. There is little or no
mention by the courts of the relative advantages of arbitration over liti-
gation. What is needed is a policy of liberal interpretation of arbitra-
tion clauses aimed at giving effect to the intent of the parties, even in the
face of ambiguity. Such a policy would promote a speedy return to nor-
mal relations following a strike and would lessen the impact of section
301.27
Even when the arbitration provision is interpreted to include
breaches of the agreement, the possible inapplicability of the Arbitration
Act remains a substantial barrier to a stay pending arbitration. The
circuit courts of appeals are mired in dissention over the scope of the
clause in section 1 of the act which excludes "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce."2  Section 3, upon which the unions
base their motions, provides for a stay pending arbitration in "any suit
or proceeding . . . upon any issue referable to arbitration under an
agreement in writing for such arbitration."29
The Fourth Circuit was the first to decide the issue in a section 301
suit.3" Feeling that Congress, in 1925, would not have intended com-
pulsory arbitration of labor contracts, the court held the exclusionary
clause applicable to collective bargaining agreements and denied the mo-
tion. The Third Circuit has run the gamut of opinion. Although decid-
ing initially that the exclusionary clause was inapplicable to section 3,1
the court later ruled that the exclusion prevented a stay.2 More recently,
26. 98 F. Supp. at 790.
27. "Employers and unions . . . know that there has to be some convenient and
expeditious method for clearing up not only the routine grievances but also the more
fundamental issues so frequently arising under collective agreements." GREGORY, L..Boa
AND THE LAw 405 (rev. ed. 1949).
28. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
29. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).
30. International Union, United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor-
ing Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). The court reaffirmed its position in United Elec.
Workers v. Miller Metal Products, 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
31. Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327
U.S. 777 (1946) ; Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 160 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1947) ;
Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948). These cases involved employee
claims to recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
32. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Em-
ployees, 193 F.21 327 (3d Cir. 1952). This case was decided after Title 9 of the United
States Code, 1946 Ed., which contained the provisions of the Arbitration Act, was codi-
fied and enacted into positive law by the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 STAT. 669. By
the same act, the Arbitration Act of 1925 was repealed. The court based its change of
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it has held the exclusion applicable to agreements of workers directly
engaged in interstate commerce but not to agreements of workers merely
producing goods for introduction into interstate commerce. 3 The Sixth
Circuit holds the exclusionary clause inapplicable since collective bargain-
ing agreements are "trade agreements" rather than "contracts of employ-
ment."34 The Tenth Circuit has held the act inapplicable to a suit to en-
force specific performance of an arbitration clause," and the Second
Circuit has stated that the act is inapplicable to collective bargaining
agreements.3 The Eighth Circuit, although not forced to decide, has
assumed a stay would be available.3 The Fifth Circuit, latest to enter
the area, sides with the Fourth Circuit in holding that the act does not
authorize the granting of a stay in section 301 suits.38
Although there is little or no Congressional history to provide an
answer, the opinion of Judge Parker in the Colonial Hardwood case
would seem correct." To assume that Congress was, 30 years ago,
willing to provide for judicial enforcement of the few collective bargain-
ind agreements which then existed is to defy historical fact.4"
position on the fact that Congress had now made contracts of employment exceptions
to the operation of the entire title.
33. Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953).
34. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.
1954). Accord, Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.
N.Y. 1951). But cf. Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944). There, the
court held the act inapplicable to a suit for wages by an individual employee.
35. Mercury Oil Refining Co. v. Oil Workers, CIO, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
The court cited Gatliff, supra note 34, as ruling.
36. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806, 809
(2d Cir. 1950). The next year, Judge Weinfeld, sitting in the Second Circuit, held the
exclusionary clause inapplicable and granted a stay. Lewittes & Sons v. United Furni-
ture Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). He explained the Shirley-Herman
decision by saying the Second Circuit had merely "suggested" the inapplicability of the
act. The circuit later denied a stay on the merits of the arbitration clause while ex-
pressly refusing to consider the availability of the act. Markel Elec. Products, Inc. v.
United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953). One of its districts interprets this
to mean the circuit is now willing to grant a stay under the act. Local 207, United Elec.
Workers v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 119 F. Supp. 877, 879 (D. Conn. 1954).
37. United Elec. Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d 376, 385 (8th Cir. 1953).
38. Lincoln Mills of Alabama v. Textile Workers, AFL, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.
1956).
39. International Union, United Furniture Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Floor-
ing Co., 169 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948). "It is perfectly clear, we think, that it was the
intention of Congress to exclude contracts of employment from the operation of all of
these provisions. Congress was steering clear of compulsory arbitration of labor dis-
putes. . . ." Id. at 36.
40. The most convincing argument for allowing stays under the act is that made by
Judge McGranery in United Office Workers, CIO v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 88
F. Supp. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1950). In holding that a collective bargaining agreement was
not a "contract of employment" within the terms of the act, however, the court relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's opinion in J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 322 (1944),
in which Mr. Justice Jackson, solely for the purpose of that case, distinguished contracts
of employment and collective bargaining agreements.
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Assuming that the stay provision of the Arbitration Act is in-
applicable, by virtue of the exclusion, does section 301 provide an in-
dependent basis under which federal courts have the power to enforce
arbitration? Unions could raise this issue by a counterclaim for specific
performance rather than a motion to stay under the Arbitration Act."
The leading case granting specific performance under section 301 is
Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 2 in which the union
sought an order requiring the employer to submit a dispute over separa-
tion pay to arbitration. Judge Wyzanski, although he admitted the legis-
lative language did not lend its full support, held that Congress intended
section 301 to provide a nationally available remedy of specific per-
formance.43 In the three years since the American Thread decision the
federal courts have shown an increasing willingness to grant equitable
While it is not the responsibility of the federal judiciary to return every piece of
ambiguous legislation to Congress for clarification, such a far-reaching step as judicial
enforcement of arbitration should be instituted by the legislature, especially if it is felt
the legislature did not foresee the impact of the legislation in question on an entirely
new body of law.
41. See Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Columbia Typographical Union, 124 F.
Supp. 322 (D.C.D.C. 1954). Employer sued union, which counterclaimed for specific
performance of an arbitration clause. Judgment was given for the union on the sole
authority of Textile Workers, CIO v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass.
1953). See also Wilson Brothers v. Textile Workers, CIO, 132 F. Supp. 163 (S.D.N.Y.
1954). The action was by an employer for breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment in by-passing the grievance and arbitration procedure. The court granted a union
motion to compel arbitration, holding that the issues were matters properly to be deter-
mined by arbitration. For specific performance of arbitration clauses generally, see
Gregory and Orlikoff, The Enforcement of Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. CHI.
L. REv. 233 (1950) ; Katz and Jaffe, Enforcing Labor Arbitration Clauses By Section
301, Taft-Hartley Act, 8 A"m. J. (n.s.) 80 (1953) ; Note, 64 HARV. L. Rav. 1239 (1952) ;
Comment, 21 U. CHl. L. REv. 251 (1954). Proponents of specific performance as a
proper remedy under section 301 maintain that had Congress meant to restrict recovery
to damages, it could have written "suits for damages" in subsection (a). This view,
however, overlooks the general intent of Congress in legislating. See note 8 supra.
42. 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953). See also United Textile Workers, AFL v.
Goodall-Sanford, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 767 (D. Maine 1955); Industrial Trades Union v.
Woonsocket Dyeing Co., 122 F. Supp. 872 (D.R.I. 1954); Insurance Agents' Union,
AFL v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1954) ; Local 207, United Elec.
Workers v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 119 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1954) ; Local 379,
United Automobile Workers, CIO v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 120 F. Supp. 228 (D. Conn. 1953) ;
Textile Workers, CIO v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. N.C. 1950). For union
suits to compel compliance with an arbitrator's award, see Milk Drivers Union, AFL v.
Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 203 F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953) ; Mercury Oil Refining Co.
v. Oil Workers, CIO, 187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951), affirming in part and reversing
in part 89 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Okla. 1950).
43. "In short, Congress, had it considered the matter, would have expected federal
courts to accord specific performance of arbitration clauses, and would not expect the
national judiciary to apply a chekerboard set of remedies adapted to the laws of the
several states, most of which do not provide for specific performance. . . . [T]his
court can reach no other result than to conclude that § 301 provides, as a nationally
available remedy, specific performance of arbitration clauses in labor contracts in in-
dustries affecting commerce." 113 F. Supp. at 141.
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relief,"4 and only recently has any effort been made to study the prob-
lem."' If section 301 is a mere procedural aid, as was held by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the Westinghouse case,4" it creates no power, only a
forum, and the American Thread doctrine is erroneous.4 7
The salient question is whether the federal judiciary should enforce
arbitration in any situation.48 The injection of more governmental con-
44. See'cases cited in note 42 supra., e.g., United Textile Workers, AFL v. Goodall-
Sanford, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 859 (D. Maine 1954) (injunction granted under 301 pre-
venting employer from terminating employment of union members). But cf. Rock Drill-
ing Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1955) (section 301 held inap-
plicable to suit by union for torts committed by employer against employees).
45. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955). The Fifth Circuit, in two recent decisions, has accepted the chal-
lenge of the Westinghouse case. In Lincoln Mills of Alabama v. Textile Workers, CIO,
230 F.2.d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), it reversed a district court's grant of specific performance
of an arbitration clause. Both the majority and dissenting opinions are excellent reviews
of the entire Westinghouse-American Thread problem as to the power given the federal
judiciary by section 301. The majority refused specific performance on the ground that
there was no common law or statutory background requiring or permitting enforcement
of such an agreement. Such a decision is in direct contravention of the American Thread
holding, and since the latter has assumed the stature of case doctrine, the Supreme Court,
almost of necessity, must resolve the conflict. In the second case, International Ladies'
Garment Workers, AFL v. Jay-Anr Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956), the court held a
suit by a union to force an employer to contribute to the employee health and welfare
fund was outside the scope of section 301. This case also follows the lead of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the Westinghouse case in finding an absence of any substantial federal
question.
46. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
348 U.S. 437 (1955). See note 9 supra.
47. 45 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1952). Section 4 of the act prohibits
federal courts from issuing "any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction
in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or
persons participating or interested in such dispute . . . from doing, whether singly or in
concert, any of the following acts. . . ." Section 13 (c) defines "labor disputes" as a
"controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the associa-
tion or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining . . . terms or con-
ditions of employment. . . ." Judge Wyzanski excused the conflict on the basis of the
purposes and Congressional history in the American Thread decision. 113 F. Supp. at
142. Subsequent cases have either ignored the problem or relied on American Thread.
Insurance Agents' Union, AFL v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa.
1954); Local 397 United Automobile Vorkers, CIO v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 120 F. Supp.
228 (D. Conn. 1953). The circuits which have mentioned the problem are in at least
dicta agreement that the act does not preclude the granting of specific performance. See
Lincoln Mills of Alabama v. Textile Workers, CIO, 230 F.2d 81, 84 (5th Cir. 1956);
W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, AFL, 217 F.2d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 1954) ; United Elec.
Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954); Tenney
Engineering, Inc. v. United Elec. Workers, 207 F.2d 450, 454 (3d Cir. 1953).
48. If judicial enforcement of arbitration becomes commonplace, it will be merely
another step in the grievance-arbitration procedure. If the moving party, each time it
wishes to arbitrate a dispute, must file suit in federal court to compel such arbitration,
nothing remains of the voluntary nature of the agreement. If specific performance is
denied, the need may arise for legitimate strikes, even in the case of unconditional no-
strike clauses. If union and management enter a long-term contract and, shortly there-
after, a dispute arises which the company refuses to arbitrate, or refuses to arbitrate
whether the dispute is wvithin the scope of arbitration, the only recourse left for a union,
if specific performance is to be denied, would be the strike. If the union could not strike
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trols, through the courts or otherwise, in an area already dangerously
overcrowded is undesirable. Governmental interference, even to the ex-
tent of judicial enforcement, weakens the urge toward voluntary action
on the part of both labor and management. 9
A court is forced to construe terms of the agreement by deciding
what the parties meant by their use of language." If the arbitration
clause provides for settlement of "all disputes," the question of whether
the parties meant to include employer demands for damages within its
scope is one for the arbitrator, not the courts. The only instance in
which a section 301 suit would be necessary to decide union liability for
a strike would be where the contract contained no arbitration procedure
or one expressly excluding breaches of the agreement from the scope
of arbitration.
In studying the advisability of section 301, Congress would be aided
by an objective study of the merits of arbitration over litigation."' The
arbitrator, deciding the issue of union liability for non-compliance with a
no-strike pledge, is not bound solely by the issue of whether the union
sponsored a walkout. If the strike is prompted by company unfair labor
and could not obtain judicial enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement, an
irresponsible employer could breach the agreement at will. See notes 54-55 infra. See
also Howard, Labor-Management Arbitration: "There Ought to Be a Law"-Or Ought
There, 21 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1956) ; Note, Arbitration of Labor Contract Disputes, 43 I..
L. REv. 678 (1949).
49. A possible union move in the event of a section 301 suit which avoids some of
the undesirable aspects of a counterclaim for specific performance would be a motion to
dismiss. The grant of such motion would divest the court of jurisdiction, a contrast to
the continuing jurisdiction which exists after an action is stayed pending arbitration.
Secondly, the court would avoid judicial enforcement of arbitration. After its action was
dismissed, the employer would have a choice of no compensation or voluntarily going to
arbitration to determine the union's liability. Further, the motion to dismiss would not
meet the problem raised against specific performance by the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) provides: "[T]he following defenses may at the option of
the pleader be made by motion: . . . (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted." Whether a federal court would entertain such a motion, based on the
ground that the court is precluded from granting any relief since the parties have pro-
vided another forum (arbitration), use of which is a condition precedent to litigation,
depends largely on the degree of liberality it is willing to use in interpreting the Federal
Rules.
50. See, e.g., United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products, Inc., 215 F.2d 221
(4th Cir. 1954) ; Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Teamsters Union, 217 F.2d 49 (6th Cir.
1954); Markel Electrical Products v. United Elec. Workers, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.
1953); Philadelphia Dress Joint Board v. Rosinsky, 134 F. Supp. (E.D. Pa. 1955) ; Borg-
Warner v. Farm Equipment Workers, 22 Lab. Arb. 443 (N.D. Ill. 1954) ; Bassick Co.
v. Bassick Local 229, affiliated with International Union of Elec. Workers, CIO, 126 F.
Supp. 777 (D. Conn. 1954) ; Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776
(E.D. Mich. 1954); Harris Hub Bed and Spring Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 121 F.
Supp. 40 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
51. See Kaye and Allen, Union Responsibility and Enforcement of Collective Bar-
gaining Argreements, 30 B.U.L. REv. 1, 26-28 (1950); CCH LAB. L. REP. 51,925-31
(1954).
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practices or a company breach, the arbitrator will take this into considera-
tion.12  In view of the relationship between the parties and the complex
nature which their disputes possess, every issue is relevant in determin-
ing responsibility. The purpose of the no-strike clause is continuity of
production through union responsibility. It should not be used to allow
irresponsible management to saddle strike costs on a union which struck
because it had no other alternative."3
Arbitration offers other advantages including lower costs, privacy,
and the lack of technicalities and inflexibilities inherent in any action at
law. The savings in time and money are considerable. Since the arbi-
tration is normally a one-meeting affair, there are no appeals to inter-
mediate or higher courts, marked by high costs and long delays due to
52. At least one federal court has refused to entertain evidence as to the nature of
the dispute which gave rise to the strike. Shirley-Herman Co. v. International Hod
Carriers Union, 182 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950). "[T]he court correctly limited the
issue before the jury to the single question whether the union had caused a cessation of
work without going to arbitration. The merits of the dispute were of no moment, since
the union had promised that regardless of the nature of a dispute which might arise,
it would not cease work but would keep on the job until the dispute was settled by the
machinery provided for in the contract." Id. at 810. The NLRB policy toward strikes
in the face of employer unfair labor practices has undergone several changes. In Scullin
Steel Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 1294 (1948), the Board held the validity of penalties assessed
against no-strike violators was conditioned on the employer's not having breached the
contract or committed unfair labor practices. See also Joseph Dyson & Sons, Inc., 72
N.L.R.B. 445 (1947); The Fanfair Bearing Co., 73 N.L.R.B. 1008 (1947). In National
Electric Products Corp., 80 N.L.R.B. 151 (1948), the Board reversed its position and
held a no-strike clause barred strikes even in the face of employer unfair labor practices.
The Board reversed itself again in Mastro Plastics Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1955), by
returning to the Scullin doctrine.
53. The doctrine of the Shirley-Herman case, note 54 supra, may have been im-
pliedly overruled by the Supreme Court in Mastro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U. S.
270 (1956). 'Strikers walked out despite an unconditional no-strike pledge after a union
official was fired for his activities in a jurisdictional battle for which the employer was
allegedly responsible. The NLRB held that discharge of the strikers was an unfair labor
practice and that the strikers, so long as they were striking solely against the employer's
actions, would not be subject to punishment for breach of the agreement. The Supreme
Court affirmed, saying, ". . . failure of the Board to sustain the right of strike against
that conduct would seriously undermine the primary objectives of the Labor Act." Id. at
278. The court expressly rejected the employer's plea that the words "any strike" in the
no-strike pledge included the instant situation. "[employer's] interpretation would elim-
inate . . . the employees' right to strike, even if petitioners, by coercion, ousted the
employees' lawful bargaining representative and, by threats of discharge, caused the
employees to sign membership cards in a new union. Whatever may be said of the
legality of such a waiver . . . there is no adequate basis for implying the existence
without a more compelling expression of it than appears in . . . this contract." Id. at
283. The Seventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in NLRB v. Wagner Iron Works,
220 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955). Although it might be argued that these cases are not in
point because they deal with employer sanctions against workers, it seems unlikely that
a federal court, in section 301 action against a union based on similar facts, could ignore
the language of the Court.
54. For representative arbitrations of union liability for violation of a no-strike
clause, see Canadian General Electric Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 925 (1952) ; Hoffman Beverage
Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 869 (1952); Phillips Chemical Co., 17 Lab. Arb. 721 (1951).
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overcrowded dockets. An additional advantage is minimization of the
combatant attitude engendered by an adversary proceeding. The arbitra-
tor's decision can do much to relieve the strained feelings and discontent
which will be the result of litigation, no matter which side is victorious.
The strike provokes bitterness and rancor between employer and em-
ployee, both of whom feel themselves wronged. A time consuming, tech-
nical and costly court battle can only further this animosity.
INITIAL IMPRISONMENT FOR THE VIOLATION OF CITY
ORDINANCES
Statutes in thirty-five states authorize municipal corporations to
enforce their ordinances by the imposition of initial imprisonment upon
convicted offenders as a part of the basic punishment, as well as to
enforce the payment of a fine.1 Although it is well settled that im-
1. Alabama: May enforce by fine not exceeding $100 and by imprisonment or hard
labor not exceeding six months, one or both. ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 455 (1940). Arizona:
$300 and 3 months limits. A~iz. CODE ANN. c. 16, §1105 (1939). California: $500 and
6 months limits. CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. §36900 (1951). Florida: $500 and 60 days limits.
FLA. STAT. § 165.19 (1955). Georgia: Georgia's cities and towns are governed by
charters which are altered by special acts. Limitations on cities, etc., must be gleaned
from these various charters. In Calhoun v. Little, 106 Ga. 336, 32 S.E. 86 (1898), the
court declared that under the charter of the town of Waresboro there was no authority
to impose initial imprisonment. However, in Jones v. Langford, 141 Ga. 336, 81 S.E.
885 (1914), Atlanta charter provisions were construed to allow for initial imprisonment,
without any provision for discharge upon payment of a fine. Idaho: $100 and 30 days
limits. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 50-1109 (1949). Indiana: $300 and 6 months limits. IND.
ANN. STAT. § 48-1407 (Burns 1950). Iowa: $100 and 30 days limits. IowA CODE ANN.
§ 366.1 (1949). Kansas: No statutory limits on 1st class cities. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 13-
424 (1949). $100 and 3 months limits in 2d and 3d class cities. Id. at §§ 14-424, 15-440.
Kentucky: $100 and 50 days limits. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 83.010, 85.120, 86.110, 87.060, 88.107
(1955). Louisiana: $100 and 30 days limits. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:401(32) (1950).
But the penalties for driving under the influence of alcohol may be $500 and 60 days.
Id. at (Stipp. 1956). Maryland: $100 and 90 days limits. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 23A, § 3 (1951). Michigan: $500 and 6 months limits. MicH. CoilP. LAWS § 89.2
(1948). But in home rule cities the limits are $500 and 90 days. Id. at § 117.4i(19).
Minnesota: $100 and 3 months limits. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 412.231 (West Supp. 1954).
Mississippi: $100 and 30 days limits. Miss. CODE ANN. § 3374-137 (Supp. 1954). Missouri:
Punishment may be by fine, imprisonment, or both. No limits are stated in the statute.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 74.657 (Vernon 1952). Montana: $300 and 90 days limits. MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 11-950 (1947). Nebraska: Cities of the 1st and 2d classes and
villages may only fine to enforce ordinances. NED. REV. STAT. §§ 16-225, 17-505 (1943).
Cities of the metropolitan class may impose both fines and imprisonment with no statutory
limits. Id. at § 14-102(25). Cities of the primary class have limits of $100 and 6 months.
Id. at § 15-263 (Supp. 1955). The latter statute, which went into effect on September
18, 1955, for the first time allowed cities of the primary class to impose initial imprison-
ment. Nevada: $300 and 6 months limits. NEV. Comp. LAWS § 1128 (1929). New Jersey:
$200 and 90 days limits. N. J. STAT. ANN. § 40:49-5 (1940). New Mexico: $300 and 90
days limits. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14:21-47 (1953). New York: No limitations stated by
